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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
merely a legislative enactment intended to regulate practice and pro-
cedure in the courts. It is submitted that the legislative rule-making
power is constitutionally valid under article VI, section 30, of the
New York State Constitution.
Collateral Estoppel: Third department abandons unity requirement.
In Albero v. State,90 plaintiff brought suit in the Court of Claims
for personal injuries allegedly suffered due to the state's negligence in
maintaining highways. The state made a motion to dismiss under
CPLR 3211(a) on the grounds that there existed a judgment against
the plaintiff for his negligence in the same accident upon which his
claim was based.
In the prior federal court action, Albero was the defendant and
the plaintiffs were the driver and passengers who were hit by Albero's
auto when it jumped the divider on a state highway. In that action, it
should be noted that Albero was unable to start a third-party action
against the state since the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction
in determining the liability of the state. It appears from both the
Court of Claims and third department opinions that in the federal
court action Albero had tried to introduce evidence that it was the
state's negligence, and not his, which had been the proximate cause of
the accident. However, it was determined by the federal jury that Al-
bero's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.91
The third department's opinion is in conformity with New York's
continuing trend towards liberal use of collateral estoppel. 92 While
Albero was decided before Schwartz v. Public Administrator,93 it ap-
pears that the Albeio decision meets the requirements for the use of
collateral estoppel as set down by Schwartz. Specifically, there must be
an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior ac-
tion and is decisive of the present action, and, secondly, there must
have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said
to be controlling. In applying these standards, it would appear that
Albero had the opportunity to show his freedom from liability and
90 31 App. Div. 2d 694, 295 N.Y.S.2d 965 (3d Dep't 1969). For the Court of Claims'
disposition, see 56 Misc. 2d 235, 289 N.Y.S.2d 14 (Ct. Cl. 1968); see also The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 302, 35-36 (1968).
91 Upon the excerpts of the record of the trial in the federal court, the Court of
Claims was unable to determine whether or not the evidence offered by Albero was con-
sidered by the jury, but it based its decision upon the instructions by the court and the
jury verdict. 56 Misc. 2d at 238-39, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 17-18.
92 See Schwartz v. Public Administrator, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d
955 (1969); DeWitt Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967).
See also pp. 144-51 supra.
93 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 NXE.2d 725, 298 N.YS.2d 955 (1969).
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failed. Therefore, in this present action against the state, he was at
least contributorily negligent, and should be precluded from maintain-
ing the action.
However, in applying the rules of collateral estoppel to a case
such as this one, where perhaps there was some merit to Albero's de-
fense and where Albero could not begin a third-party action in the
federal district court, it is questionable whether the decision did in
fact allow for a full and fair opportunity to oppose the state's conten-
tions. In the federal district court the jury was presented with severely
injured plaintiffs and with Albero as the sole defendant. From the
decision it appears that those plaintiffs were free from any liability
from the beginning and that the only question was as to Albero's
negligence. Albero's defense, that it was the negligence of the state
which caused the accident, if allowed and accepted by the jury as true,
would then give the plaintiffs no recovery, and force them to sue the
state by way of an action in the Court of Claims. The state is thereby
placed in a superior position, because if the jury accepted Albero's de-
fense, the state would not be collaterally estopped from successfully
asserting its freedom from negligence in the Court of Claims, and if the
jury did not accept Albero's defense, that finding could subsequently
be used against him in the form of collateral estoppel by the state.
The problem of Albero is one of fairness and opportunity, and
liberal use of collateral estoppel can prove fatal to many in Albero's
position. In his dissenting opinion in Schwartz, Justice Bergan high-
lighted the problem of collateral estoppel:
In this vast legal enterprise there are certain injured parties whose
litigation position involves a handicap. These parties would, like all
other injured persons, be quite certain of recovery could they assert
their claims in simple, direct form, unencumbered by other conflicting
claims.94
ARTICLE 52 -ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS
CPLR 5201: Future rents not subject to attachment.
In Glassman v. Hyder,95 the Court of Appeals, affirming the judg-
ment of the Appellate Division, First Department," held that future
rents were contingent and therefore not attachable as debts to be-
come due "certainly or upon demand." The Court, in so holding,
94 Id. at 77, 246 N.E.2d at 732, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 965 (1969).
95 23 N.Y.2d 354, 244 N.E.2d 259, 296 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1968).
96 28 App. Div. 2d 974, 283 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1st Dep't 1967). For a discussion of the
appellate division's treatment of Glassman v. Hyder, see The Quarterly Survey of New
York Practice, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. Rlv. 140, 165 (1968).
[VOL. 44
